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north korea
between dogmatism
and revisionism

SIK LEE
CHONG
CHONGSIK

one of the toughest problems premier kim 11
il song of
north korea had to face during his quarter century old rule
over north korea has been the cleavage between peking and
moscow there is a korean adage which says Sh
shrimps
scrimps
rimps get
crushed when whales fight
and indeed the red whales
have been locked in battle for quite some time and the little
red shrimp caught in between has had to find ways to fend for
himself
the problem was a tough one particularly because north
korea needed the friendship of both the soviet union and
communist china in order to develop its economy to maintain its defense forces and to engage in the violent and nonviolent struggles against the republic of korea the experience of the korean war had clearly shown that the support
of both moscow and peking was essential for north korea
at that time the soviet union provided the airplanes tanks
artillery and all the modern military hardware to launch the
war but it was chinese manpower that eventually rescued
north korea from being completely overrun the situation
since then has changed considerably but not as much as the
north korean communists would have liked
the problem was very exasperating particularly because the
sino soviet rift dealt with many of the key issues the dis
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pute ranged over the ideology strategy and tactics of communist revolution the nature of leadership and the relationship among the communist countries As points of contention
gradually shifted from the more general to the specific it became increasingly more difficult for north korea to plaster
over the issues tremendous pressurewas
pressure was exerted from both
sides for north korea to clarify its views and therefore it
could not muddle through the dispute the price tag for taking a stand however was going to be high regardless of whom
the north koreans sided with
in many ways the situation confronting north korea can
be compared to a small ship attempting to navigate through
a narrow river let us for a moment imagine a situation
where china is occupying the left bank and russia the right
bank we may call the river the river of internationalism
when the relationship of the two countries bordering the river
is amicable the ship can progress rather smoothly taking advantage of the facilities and supplies from both banks but
the ship cannot but be affected when the winds from both
banks whip up storms over the river and suppose the river
of Internation
ail sm begins to freeze
ali
internationalism
internationals
internationali
indeed at times the river of internationalism seems to be
frozen over and the frail ship has to anchor at either of the
shores finding the
die atmosphere on the right bank hostile the
ship briefly takes refuge on the left bank but the left bank
cannot provide the needed supplies and parts and hence the
captain has to take his ship across the icy waters to the other
shore inescapably hearing the resentful muttering of his old
host when the ship s equilibrium has been restored therefore the captain tries again to steer through the ice to the
left bank of course the whole situation stalls the ship s progress creating numerous problems having been promised a
land of milk and honey the crew has labored around the
clock
dock for a long period of time at least some of the crew
begin to doubt the captain s way of navigating they may
even attempt a mutiny
let us briefly look at the ship itself the democratic
people s republic of korea was officially launched in 1948
but its origin must be traced back to 1946 when the north
korean provisional people s committee was established the
north korean regime whatever its official designation may
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by
be was a byproduct
product of the cold war and it came into being
under soviet tutelage the crew running the ship the korean
worker s party is an outgrowth of the north korean bureau
of the korean communist party established in october 1945
of course the history of korean communism goes back to
1918 but the movement was largely ineffectual before 1945
and the communists could not have taken over control in
north korea without soviet support the captain of the ship
il song was
or the leader of the north korean regime kim 11
installed in his office soon after the soviet army occupied
north korea in october 1945 although he had led a small
erillas in southeastern manchuria beband of anti japanese guerrillas
guerillas
gu
tween 1931 and 1941 when he was still in his twenties kim
11
il song was much too young to take over the leadership position in north korea without soviet blessing
all this is to say that the ship the crew and the captain
were made by the russians according to russian designs up
to 1950 when the korean war broke out and the chinese
poured massive manpower into korea no one had any doubt
as to who was in actual control in north korea kim 11
il song
may have been at the helm but he was following a course
charted by moscow and under the latter s close supervision
the establishment of the chinese people s republic and
her intervention in the korean war changed matters considerably the russians for example had to share control of military strategy with the chinese and as the war dragged on
authority had to be shared in broader areas this situation
gave the north koreans an opportunity to assert themselves
more the reluctance of the russians to commit themselves
deeply to the cause of the koreans must also have led the
korean communists to think more for themselves it is possible that certain under
undercurrents
determin
currents of thought toward self determine
atlon and independence emerged among the leaders in pyongyang kim 11
il song was not strong enough to defy or even disagree with the soviet advisers and leaders but he could not
have been pleased by the lukewarm way in which the russians
handled themselves during the korean war
in the postwar years by war 1I mean here the korean
war when north korea went about the task of reconstructing its economy surface relations appeared cordial and friendly but the north korean communists later charged when
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their relations with the soviet union were greatly aggravated
that the russians interferred in economic planning aspects of
education publications and other internal matters the russians were also accused of buying certain commodities from
north korea at below the international market price and selling things to north korea at relatively higher prices north
koreans were tolerating the russians but they certainly had
no love for the russians the russians of course are not the
only ones in the world that face this kind of situation in any
event as the korean communists began to lose faith in the
russians they started to urge the people to think more in
korean terms and learn more about their own country it was
in december 1955 that kim 11
il song introduced the term chuche or self identity in fact the most accurate translation of
chu che would be to do one s own thing by 1956 with
chuche
the end of the three year economic plan one could detect that
il song and his crew had come out of the tutelage and
kim 11
were heading toward self determination although they still
badly needed russian aid particularly in the economic and
military areas although the chinese began then to loom large
in korea they appear to have been more judicious than the
russians in their behavior toward the koreans despite the
fact that kim 11
il song had spent approximately four years between 1941 and 1945 in soviet territory the cultural gap
between the koreans and the russians was much wider than
that between the koreans and the chinese in addition to
close associhistorical influences kim 11
il song and some of his dose
ates were raised in manchuria among the chinese indeed
il song was a member of the chinese communist party
kim 11
in his early days
in any event the role of the captain of the ship changed
considerably between 1945 and 1956 by the latter date he
was no longer an apprentice taking orders from his tutor
master the russian tutor master then became an adviser and
occasional helper who assisted the ship s progress toward its
destination the captain s main concern or the announced
destination was to build a democratic base in the north
which would enable korea s eventual reunification although
the captain saw fit to purge some of the top crew members in
1950 1953 1956 and again in 1958 the ship was on the
whole sailing smoothly toward that goal
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but the captain began to feel turbulence in the open channel around 1961 when he had just launched an ambitious
to blow from
beganto
seven year economic plan strong winds began
befanto
both directions and eventually the channel began to freeze
the circumstances and the issues involved in the sino soviet
dispute are rather well known and we need not dwell on the
details but we must briefly look into three major issues in
the sino soviet dispute that deeply concerned the korean com1
ts ie
munists
the role of war in the socialist revolution
2 de stalinization and 3 the nature of international prolet
letarianism
As is well known khrushchev enunciated at the twentieth
congress of the communist party of the soviet union held in
february 1956 the principle of peaceful coexistence although
lenin had taught that wars were inevitable so long as imperialism existed and that wars would inevitably lead to
socialist victory khrushchev declared that war in the modern
era would be unthinkable because nuclear war would destroy
not only the capitalist societies but the socialist societies as
khruschev called for an improvement of
well therefore khrushchev
relations a strengthening of trust between countries and collab oration the eventual victory of socialism communism was
laboration
predicted but it would be attained not through wars but
through peaceful competition
the chinese of course objected to this line of policy the
chinese believed that the development of the sputnik and the
ICBM placed the soviet union ahead of the west and hence
the communists should exert more pressure against the
die united
states on such issues as taiwan the chinese obviously did
not see the possibility of taking over taiwan through peaceful means
if the chinese objected to the peaceful line because it
hindered their aim of bringing taiwan back into the fold
one can easily imagine the anguish of the korean communists
the north korean communists had all but unified korea
in 1950 had not the american imperialists intervened the
communists would have attained their dream for the dream
of communizing the entire country the communists had committed all their resources but ended up with a disasterous
disaster ous defeat it was simply impossible for the korean communists to
accept khrushchev s dictum to improve relations strengthen
trust or collaborate with american imperialists
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how the principle of peaceful coexistence tormented the
korean communists could be seen from the way premier kim

he

was forced to declare that
the principle of peaceful coexistence was absolutely correct
but on the other hand he declared that the idea that korea
could be separated into northern and southern part
partss and that
dangerous it
the parts should coexist with each other is very dangerousit
on another
is a view obstructing our efforts for unification
occasion kim 11
il song derided those who advocated the toning
down of strong anti american slogans because the soviet
union was relaxing her stand against the united states the
premier charged that this kind of advocacy not only had no
common ground with revolutionary creativity but also paralyzed our people s revolutionary awareness
he twisted logic
to say that north korea s struggle against american imperialists was in harmony with soviet policy of peaceful coexistence
he argued that north korea s hawkish stand against the
united states would soften the american imperialists and
hence contribute to peace
the fact that north korea agreed with china on the
question of war as a means of attaining communist victory
was clearly manifested in the sixties when north korea threw
off the mask and came out into the open the following
shao chi and
quotation taken from a joint statement of liu shaochi
ch oe yong gon the two heads of state in 1963 is typical
of north korea s stand since then
II
il song handled the problem

the

modern revisionists emasculate the revolutionary essence of marxism leninism paralyze the revolutionary will
of the working class and working people meet the needs of
imperialism and the reactionaries of various countries and
undermine the unity of the socialist camp and the revolutionary struggles of all peoples they do not themselves oppose
imperialism and forbid others to oppose imperialism they
do not want revolution themselves and forbid others to make
revolution

the

hawkish behavior of the korean communists is already widely known and hence it will not be necessary for me
to dwell on this subject suffice it to recall the pueblo affair
the shooting down of an EC 191 US plane and the numerous
incidents near the demarcation line culminating in the daring
attack of a band of guerrillas on the presidential residence inside seoul in january 1968 since december 1962 when the
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is in fact a communist party
decided to turn the entire domain into a military fortress

korean workers party which

north korea has devoted a great proportion of its human and

material resources to building up its military strength so far
there is no sign that north korea intends to relax its militant
line of policy any attempt on the part of the united states
and the republic of korea to reduce tension would be interpreted as a sign of weakness reduction of tension on the
korean peninsula will require considerable patience and skill
on the part of those who desire such an outcome
khrushchev s sensational de stalinization campaign also affected the korean communists in a serious way the chinese
communists are alleged to have stated in their secret letter
to the soviet party dated september 10 1960 that the real
difference between themselves and khrushchev began when
khrushchev denied stalin s positive role without previous discussion with the other communist parties it is evident that
khrushchev did not consult the korean communists before his
famous speech at the twentieth congress and hence it is possible that this lack of prior consultation may have opened a gap
between moscow and pyongyang but being a smaller power
offence at khrushnorth korea probably did not take as much offense
chev s manner of handling the affair as the chinese leaders
the north korean press did not report on khrushchev s speech
nor did it comment upon it for some time to come only in
november 1961 did the premier declare that the problem of
how to evaluate stalin s activities in the USSR belongs to the
infra party problems of the CPSU
category of intraparty
intra
the problem for premier kim 11il song however was that
khrushchev and many other revisionists throughout the
world chose to extend the de stalinization campaign to other
communist societies and called for changes in the direction of
increasing democratization and checks and balances on the
exercise of absolute power to make matters worse there
were elements in the north korean leadership that echoed
these sentiments and called for drastic changes within north
korea this eventually led to a major and unprecedented
revolt at a plenum of the central committee of the korean
workers party in august 1956 and according to our informants the russian ambassador in pyongyang abetted the
rebels
I1
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denunciation of a dead emperor of course is by no means
unprecedented in korean history but these somewhat disloyal
acts were always perpetrated for the benefit of those in power
rather than with a view to overthrow the current regime
obviously the premier could not sit idly by and let his
enemies destroy him he acted resolutely and pinned the sins
of individual heroism the root of the cult of personality on
his opponents disclaiming the fact that the cult of personality
had ever existed in north korea the premier and his apologists argued that collective leadership had always been practiced in north korea
the fact of the matter of course is that ever since the
russians installed kim il song at the helm of power in 1945
the north korean communists have steadily built a cult of
personality around him systematically destroying all his rivals
as spies and running dogs of american imperialists mao tse
tung may not have been a stalinist but there was no doubt
about kim 11
il song
the revolt of 1956 provided the occasion for kim 11il song
to carry out a massive campaign to purge all his opponents
all the party members high and low were rescreened and
any cadre who had had a remote connection with the purged
leaders was thoroughly investigated massive indoctrination
campaigns ensued to insure unmitigated loyalty to the personality of the premier histories were rewritten to sanctify his
every act real and imaginary every word he had ever uttered
became the eternal truth the mirror of unrivaled wisdom for
more than a decade since then the korean communists have
continued an endless series of campaigns to adulate and even
diecy
diefy the premier close scrutiny leads me to believe that the
extent of the cult of personality in north korea today exceeds
that of communist china in north korea today kim 11
il song
is the embodiment of the state the nation and the party was
this heightening of the cult of personality in north korea a
reaction against khrushchev s attempt to eliminate such a
phenomenon or was this something the korean communists
had intended even before the de stalinization campaign
whatever the answers to these questions we can be sure that
il song firmly disagreed with khrushchev and the rekim 11
visionists on the issue of the cult of personality
one of the themes of the 1957 moscow declaration of the
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communist and socialist parties stressed was the principle of
socialist internationalism it said

the

socialist countries base their relations on principles
of complete equality respect for territorial integrity state
independence and sovereignty and non interferrence in one
another s affairs these are vital principles however they
do not exhaust the essensa
essense of relations between them fraternal mutual aid is part and parcel of these relations this
aid is a striking expression of socialist internationalism

while stalin

was alive the hierarchical relationship within
the communist camp was never questioned the soviet union
was unquestionably regarded as the fatherland of socialism
and the supremacy of stalin was never in doubt questioning
these relationships involved great risks particularly because
the korean communists had been placed in power in north
korea by the soviet occupation forces and because they depended greatly on soviet support north korea s adulation
of the soviet union was quite extreme

communists did talk of proletarian internationalism before but the meaning used to be quite different for example the may 1954 issue of the party organ
kulloja the worker carried an article proletarian internationalism is the banner of the korean people s life but
the key of the entire article is a quotation from stalin who
said internationalists are those who are prepared to defend
the soviet union unconditionally without complaint and
without hesitation
starting from there the korean author
argues that true internationalists and true communists must
identify the love they have toward their own people and the
fatherland with their love toward the soviet union and that
they must be boundlessly faithful to the soviet union in an
article published in 1955 entitled proletarian internationalism and the korean revolution however the author stresses
the aid from fraternal countries as the manifestation of internationalism in 1958 the term internationalism was again
redefined to mean the
and strengthening of the socialunityyand
dle unityand
die
unit
ist camp centered around the soviet union finally an article
published in the same journal in 1962 was entitled self
reliance is the basic principle of proletarian internationalism
thus the party members and others in north korea are
constantly exhorted to espouse internationalism but the mean

the korean
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ing of the term has changed drastically during the last eight
years at one time the term was used to hold up love of
the soviet union after 1962 internationalism became a synonym for nationalism
there were of course good reasons for these changes
stalin died and was disgraced china and other communist
countries began to rise and assert themselves these countries
furthermore disagreed among themselves on some of the more
important issues to make matters worse khrushchev attempted to dictate to his allies in too crude a manner while
preaching the virtue of collective leadership he tended to
brush off the opinions of leaders of other communist societies
in the eyes of the chinese the koreans and some other comts khrushchev was a big power chauvinist
munists
it was
natural for them to demand the recognition of equality territorial integrity independence sovereignty and noninterference
in internal affairs
the korean communists of course had been accustomed
to soviet control and supervision for quite some time at the
height of the quarrels with moscow kim II
il song himself had
revealed the extent of soviet interference the russians of
course had a hand in north korean economic planning and
allegedly criticized many aspects of the north korean plans
the russians also kept an eye on the content and manner of
news reporting insisting on publishing some of the russian
party materials in the north korean party organs they also
had a hand in the instruction of the russian language in the

north korean

schools

what angered kim 11il song the most

however was khrushchev s support of some of the anti kim elements in 1956 1I
have already alluded to the 1956 revolt among the leading
communists in pyongyang it was true that kim 11
il song surkimm
kimn
vived and that the anti kim elements were purged kirn
kim s opponents faced of course very big odds but nonetheless the
threat was real and formidable the russian support for these
rivals therefore could not be easily forgiven or forgotten but
there was no sign that khrushchev would change his tactics
against those who disagreed with him although we do not
know the details of the pressures exerted on pyongyang before
1961 we do know that khrushchev tried to drum out albania
and china from the socialist camp in 1961 when north
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korean delegates appeared at various east european communist gatherings they were openly insulted it was clear
that north korea would face the fate of albania and china
if she persisted in differing with khrushchev the choice
given to pyongyang by 1961 was either to conform or fight
back
kim 11
il song did decide to fight it out in some respects
there was no choice having purged his opponents who took
ian line kim 11
il song could not very well turn
the khrushchevian
Khrushchev
around and submit to khrushchev of course on all three
issues that concerned north korea deeply the korean communists agreed implicitly with the chinese so beginning in
1961 pyongyang issued statement after statement which did
not differ very much from those emanating from peking altil song continued to warn against dogmatism as
hough kim 11
well as revisionism there was no doubt that moscow regarded
the korean communists as the dogmatists
it may have satisfied kim 11il song s ego to denounce
khrushchev assert his independence and advocate a hawkish
line but the korean communists quickly learned that they
were pitched against too powerful an opponent the first
element to suffer the consequence of the deteriorating relations with the soviet union was the north korean defense
structure even though north korea did develop some defense
industries what they produced was obviously not adequate for
modern warfare north korea was far from being able to
produce MIGs missiles and other highly developed military
hardware communist china however was not in a position
to supply this badly needed equipment it is probable that
moscow had been providing this equipment and spare parts
to pyongyang gratis or at least on highly favorable terms but
when pyongyang began to act in a recalcitrant manner moscow simply told pyongyang to pay its own way the cost of
maintaining the existing stocks of equipment alone would be
staggering for a small society such as north korea it is also
probable that the korean communists decision of december
1962 to stress military preparedness even at the expense of
sacrificing economic development was directly related to the
russian decision to halt military aid to north korea
we do know that the korean communists moved into
the program of turning the whole country into a fortress at
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full steam factories went underground underground air
fields were built a red militia was organized and trained rice
and salt were stored away in the mountains all to defend the
realm against a full scale attack from the south beginning in
the summer of 1963 more and more agents were dispatched
to the south to build a guerrilla base and to organize the
revolutionary masses why the sudden militancy did the
world situation in 1962 and 1963 warrant these actions what
frightened the korean communists in the north we must
remember that this was still the era of president ngo dinh
diem in vietnam and the americanization of the vietnam
war had not even started diem was overthrown only in november 1963.
1963
quite possibly the north koreans were badly frightened
by their weakness resulting from the sudden reversal of the
russian policy of supporting north korean defense systems
perhaps the korean communists did not anticipate that
khrushchev would cut off military aid to north korea caught
in a very vulnerable situation north korea began to dig in
ordering everyone to prepare for a massive assault from the
south there is no hard evidence to support these theories
however and it will be some time before they are either
proven or disproven
regardless of what caused the north koreans to turn to
militancy the cost of these programs was very heavy both in
economic and human terms in spite of severe labor shortages
the regime allocated a significant portion of available manpower to military programs scarce financial resources had to
be allocated to intensified military programs north korea announced in 1967 that more than a third of its state budget had
been allocated to defense the result of all this which 1I believe was caused by khrushchev s decision to cut off military
aid to north korea was that the seven year economic plan
launched in 1961 had to be delayed in 1966 the sixth year
of the seven year plan north korea announced that the seven
year plan would be delayed for three years even the three
year delay however did not permit the north koreans to attain the ambitious goals set for themselves in 1961 at the
fifth congress of the korean workers party held in november 1970 the premier released statistics on only six commodo
commodi
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ties but even there we find that all but coal production fell
agals
aoals 1
orilyinal goals
short of the original
this situation obviously called for adjustment the frail
ship had to leave the left bank and somehow be steered to the
right bank where supply was more abundant we can easily

imagine therefore the elation of the korean communists at
the news of khrushchev s downfall the hostility of the communist party of the soviet union may not have been all personal but khrushchev s downfall at least provided a face
saving opportunity to accost the russians again the opportunity in fact came much sooner than expected soon after
kosygin ascended to the seat of power he paid a personal
kosigin
visit to pyongyang in february 1965 it should be noted parenthetically that this was kosigin
kosygin s second visit to pyongyang
although plans had been made for khrushchev s visit on two
occasions the visit had never materialized
an immediate product of kosygin
kosigin s visit was the signing
of the USSR
USSRDPRK
DPRK military agreement at the end of may
1965
this was followed by the conclusion of an agreement
on economic and technical cooperation on june 20 1966 in
pursuance of which an economic and scientific technical consultative
sulta tive committee was reestablished in october 1967 it is
generally believed that the soviet union resumed shipping
iles to north korea after
badly needed equipment and sup
supplies
pp lies
ap
these agreements As of 1970 north korea is believed to have
15
1.3 million red
412500 men in the regular armed forces and 13
13
militia it possesses some six hundred airplanes including some
MIG 21s and MIG 17s four submarines ten destroyers self
propelled artillery and T 34 tanks north korea probably has
a better air force and navy than the republic of korea
the resumption of aid from the soviet union was inevitably reflected in north korea s stand on the sino soviet
Pyonkyang
pyonkyang of course had to move slowly and caudispute pyongyang
il song renewed the
tiou sly in october 1965 premier kim 11
tiously
old and familiar theme of uniting the international socialist
camp and the need for taking joint steps in the struggle
against imperialism this clearly meant considerable change
premier
ernier was 27.5
coal production in 1970 according to the pr
275 million tons
the original plan called for 25 million tons other statistics were electric
25
ewh crude steel 22
power 16500 of the 19400
19440 million kwh
2.3
2.2
23 million tons
22 of 23
ig
1.6
1.5
16 million
textiles 400 of 500 million linear meters chemical fertilizer 15
15 of lg
45
tons cement 4 of 43
4.3
43 million tons
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from the earlier denunciations of the soviet union but the
parting shot against peking was fired on august 12 1966
shinmun the labor news
shmmun
when the party organ nodong
bodong shinjun
devoted its editorial to the theme of self identity while the
editorial attacked revisionists as before it was more emphatic
in denouncing dogmatism which according to the editorial
emphasized only the general principles of marxism leninism
ignoring the changed conditions or specific characteristics of a
A similar theme was again sounded in october
country
il song who said
1966 by kim 11
leftist opportunism or dogmatism does not take into
consideration the changed realities and by dogmatically repeating individual tasks defined in marxism leninism it
leads the people to extremist actions by taking up super
revolutionary slogans it also isolates the party from the
people splinters revolutionary strength and makes it impossible to concentrate the attack against the main enemy

it

kim 11il song was referring to the
great cultural revolution in china when he spoke of the
is safe to assume that

super revolutionary slogans and the splintering of the revolutionary struggles
what kim 11il song wanted was a reconciliation between
china and the soviet union in order to bring about joint
actions against imperialism he implored the chinese to distinguish between the enemy and the friends who have committed errors
the premier was now against narrow mind
edness
the whole speech reminds one of mao tse tung s
famous speech on the correct handling of contradictions
delivered at the time of the hundred flowers campaign but
the chinese were not willing to listen to kim il
II song in early
1967 the red guards in ch
ina
lna attacked kim 11
china
il song as a fat
revisionist and a disciple of khrushchev living in luxury
while the people suffered and creating economic chaos through
his policies in the spring of 1968 kim was further attacked
as an out and out counterrevolutionary
counter revolutionary revisionist
as well
as a millionnaire an aristocrat and a leading bourgeois element in korea an official of the peking government criticized north korea in january 1968 for sitting on the fence
the feud between pyongyang and peking however did not
last long perhaps peking was convinced that the korean communists were not revisionists after all the koreans could not
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have been more daring and hence more revolutionary when
they seized the pueblo on january 23 1968 and shot down
a US reconnaissance plane EC 191
revisionists simply
could not perpetrate such acts furthermore the koreans had
not retaliated against the chinese in kind when the latter had
slung mud at the koreans in any event both pyongyang and
peking were ready to reconcile their differences in october
1969 when the chinese celebrated the twentieth anniversary
of the founding of the republic ch oe yong gon the number
two man in north korea and the head of the presidium of the
supreme assembly of the DPRK led the attending korean
delegation in april 1970 chou en lai paid a return visit to
pyongyang signaling the restoration of friendly relations between the two communist powers chou s april 5 speech delivered upon his arrival at the pynogyang airport could very
well have been delivered a few years ago when pyongyang
was closely standing by the chinese I1 shall quote two paragraphs from the short speech to convey chou s sentiments
china and korea are neighbors

as closely related as lips

and teeth and our two peoples are intimate brothers both
in the long struggle against japanese imperialism and in the
war of resistance against US imperialist aggression our two
peoples stood together and fought shoulder to shoulder
common struggles have bound our two peoples in a profound militant friendship our friendship is cemented with
blood it has been long tested and will stand up to future
tests

at

present US imperialism is advocating in asia a
policy of war expansion of making asians fight asians
fostered energetically by US imperialism the japanese reaction aries are stepping up the revival of militarism willingactionaries
ly serving as the former s shock troops
colluding with
each other the US and japanese reactionaries are directing
the spearhead of their aggression squarely against the peoples
of china korea the three countries of indio china and
other asian countries under such circumstances the further
strengthening of the militant unity between the chinese and
korean peoples is of great significance the chinese people
will forever stand by the fraternal korean people in their
struggle to defend the security of their fatherland

II song replied in kind
kim il

should US imperialism and
japanese imperialism forget the historical lesson and dare to
launch a new adventuresome war of aggression again then
the korean people will again as in the past together with
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the chinese people fight against the enemy to the end the
common enemies of the chinese and korean communists are
the so called american imperialists and japanese reactionaries the attitude toward imperialism still brings peking
and pyongyang together north korea still finds it impossible
to follow the russian policy of strengthening the trust or
collaborating with the west
north korea s switch toward peking was again confirmed
at the fifth congress of the korean workers party held in
november 1970 this was the first party congress held since
1961 and like party congresses of all other communist parties this was the time to review past accomplishments and set
forth the new direction
this of course does not mean that north korea is going
to attack the russian revisionists with the same intensity as
1963 64 period the korean communists are not
during the 196364
likely to forget the bitter and harsh experience of those years
principles are very important for the communists but survival is essential
how should we then evaluate the korean communists in
north korea are they the dogmatists as some of the revisionists charged or are they the revisionists as the
chinese labeled them some time ago or are they simply op
portunists sitting between two stools
the facts of the last decade 1I have presented to you should
speak for themselves my conclusion however is that they
are deeply committed to orthodox or traditional versions of
marxism leninism which called for war as a means of attaining communist victory they are the stalinists who believe in the role of the hero in history and believe in compulsive and coercive control of the masses to attain the established goals they are also the nationalists who wish to elevate
their status not only within the communist camp but also in
the world arena but they are deeply frustrated simply because
they are trying to fight against the historical current their
frustration is likely to mount within the foreseeable future
rather than recede we must keep a sharp eye on the frail
ship lest it explode in frustration and take the rest of us
with it
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